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The Wisdom of the Crowd applied to financial markets asserts that
prices, an average of agents’ beliefs, are more accurate than individual
beliefs. However, a market selection argument implies that prices even-
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which agents naively learn from equilibrium prices, a dynamic Wisdom of
the Crowd holds. Market participation increases agents’ accuracy, and equi-
librium prices are more accurate than the most accurate agent. If we replace
naive learning with Bayes’ rule, this positive result disappears.
Keywords: Wisdom of the Crowd, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Market Selection Hy-
pothesis, Naive Learning.
JEL Classification: D53, D01, G1
∗We wish to thank Larry Blume, Giulio Bottazzi, David Easley, Daniele Giachini, Willemien
Kets, Alvaro Sandroni, Rajiv Sethi, as well as conference and seminar participants at ESEM 2017
(Lisbon), SAET 2017 (Faro), Bocconi University, Catholic University (Milan), the Cowles Foun-
dation’s 13th Annual Conference on General Equilibrium and Its Applications, RoDeO (Venice),
ASSET 2016 (Thessaloniki), and IMPA (Rio de Janeiro) for their comments and suggestions.
Pietro Dindo acknowledges the support of the Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship
PIOF-GA-2011-300637 within the 7th European Community Framework Programme and the
hospitality of the Department of Economics at Cornell University.
†Corresponding author. Tel.:+61 (2) 9385 5754; e-mail: f.massari@unsw.edu.au.
1
1 Introduction
The informational content of prices is a central issue in the analysis of equilib-
ria of competitive markets. In financial markets, in particular, asset prices are
often believed to be good predictors of the economic performance of the under-
lying fundamentals. Three different mechanisms have been proposed as possi-
ble explanations for this remarkable property. The rational expectation and the
learning-from-price literatures argue that equilibrium prices are accurate because
they reveal and aggregate the information of all market participants. The Market
Selection Hypothesis, MSH, proposes instead that prices become accurate because
they eventually reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent. The Wisdom
of the Crowd argument, WOC, however suggests that market prices are accurate
because individual, idiosyncratic errors are averaged out by the price formation
mechanism.
Although these theories aim to explain the same phenomenon, they rest on
different and somehow conflicting hypotheses. In the learning-from-price literature,
all agents are assumed to agree on the way to interpret information. In equilibrium,
when all private information gets revealed, all agents must hold the same belief
because they cannot “agree to disagree.” Therefore, the MSH and the WOC
arguments are void. By contrast, in the MSH and WOC literatures, agents can
disagree on how to interpret information about fundamentals. However, existing
models of market selection are incompatible with WOC because they do not allow
for belief heterogeneity in the long-run: by selecting the most accurate agent, the
market destroys all accuracy gains that could be achieved by balancing out agents’
opposite biases.
To reconcile these three mechanisms, we propose a market selection model in
which agents believe that asset prices are a good predictor of the fundamentals,
but lack what is needed to extract information from them. We assume that each
agent’s beliefs for next-period states are formed by giving weight to two different
models. The first model, market probabilities, is common to all agents and coincides
with the prediction implied by the market consensus. The second model, dogmatic
probabilities, is agent specific and represents everything that each agent has learned
according to his subjective probabilistic view of the world. This rule of thumb, first
introduced by Manski (2006) in the context of static prediction markets, captures
the idea that agents’ opinions might depend on equilibrium prices in a way that
is not fully rational. Full rationality would require each agent to have a correct
model of how other agents process information — a situation which never occurs
in practice. On the contrary, agents in our model settle on a second best: they
naively incorporate other agents’ opinions by anchoring their beliefs to equilibrium
prices. We interpret this rule as depicting the beliefs of an agent who tries to find
a compromise between his subjective view about fundamentals and the possibility
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that markets might be accurate after all.
In this paper, we describe how this simple rule affects the equilibrium dynamics
of agents’ consumption-shares and asset prices in an otherwise standard dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with complete markets (as in Sandroni, 2000;
Blume and Easley, 2006). The following are our main findings.
First, we define WOC as the situation in which price probabilities are more
accurate than all dogmatic probabilities, and discuss the conditions under which it
occurs. Under mild assumptions (i.e., there are at least two agents whose dogmatic
probabilities are biased in different directions), we show that a WOC emerges when
agents sufficiently weigh the market probability in forming their beliefs. In this
case, the equilibrium path exhibits long-run heterogeneity, market probabilities
never settle down, and WOC occurs.
Second, we show that market accuracy is a virtuous self-fulfilling prophecy. All
else equal, if market participants believe that prices are accurate, prices are indeed
accurate. In markets populated by agents whose beliefs follow our rule, selection
forces determine a market probability process that is mean-reverting around the
value that makes all surviving agents equally accurate. We prove our result by
approaching the limiting case in which agents put all the weight on market prob-
abilities when forming their predictions. Prices become accurate because giving
more weight to market probabilities makes agent beliefs more similar, thus reduc-
ing the volatility of the market probability process and pushing the turning value
of the (mean-reverting) price process closer to the truth.
Third, we identify and characterize the key component of agent beliefs for
survival, and thus also for the WOC to hold. We show that survival does not
only depend on the accuracy of agents’ dogmatic probabilities, but also on agent
contribution to the diversity of the market opinion. If the dogmatic probabilities
of two agents are biased in the same way, only the most accurate agent survives
because the beliefs of the least accurate do not contribute to market diversity.
However, if the dogmatic probabilities of two agents are not biased in the same
way, both agents survive, and the WOC occurs. Furthermore, we prove that the
belief formation rule we consider provides an evolutionary advantage to agents.
The survival chances of an agent are (weakly) higher if his beliefs incorporate
market probabilities rather than blindly trust his dogmatic opinion.
Lastly, we add a layer of sophistication to our belief formation rule and discuss
the case in which agents learn in a Bayesian way how much weight to give to the
market probability component of their beliefs. This layer of sophistication guar-
anties agents survival but destroys the WOC. In economies in which all agents use
Bayes’ rule to update the relative weight they attach to market probabilities, the
WOC does not occur. Instead, all agents survive and coordinate their beliefs on
the most accurate dogmatic probabilities.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related
literature. In Section 2, we introduce the model and characterize agent beliefs.
Section 3 defines accuracy and WOC. The main results are presented in Section 4:
first, we provide sufficient conditions for a dynamic WOC to occur; then, we prove
that market accuracy is a virtuous self-fulfilling prophecy. Section 5 discusses
agents survival and the relation between learning and WOC. Throughout the paper
we use simulations for illustrative purposes; their length varies to accommodate
the different convergence rates. Proofs are in two Appendices.
1.1 Related literature
A very influential stream of literature argues that asset prices are accurate because
financial markets are an efficient aggregator of private information (Grossman,
1976, 1978; Radner, 1979; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Closely related to the
literature on information transmission (Aumann, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemar-
chakis, 1982), this literature assumes that agents disagree due solely to differences
in their private information and provides conditions under which the price forma-
tion mechanism reveals all private information to all agents in the market. Because
all agents agree on the way to interpret information, and prices instantaneously
reveal all available information, in equilibrium all agents must hold the same be-
liefs and no WOC or selection based on belief heterogeneity can occur. Prices are
accurate because they reflect and aggregate all relevant information. However, it is
hard to imagine that most agents active in financial markets can agree on what in-
formation is relevant and how to interpret it — “Ordinary investors have no model
or at best a very incomplete model of the behavior of prices, dividends, or earnings
of speculative assets” — Shiller (1984). In fact, there is overwhelming evidence
documenting the inability of agents to process information “rationally,” even in
simple experimental settings (Kahneman, 2011), and that agents who use well es-
tablished models might be acting irrationally by failing to account for transaction
costs (Barber and Odean, 1999) or estimation errors (DeMiguel et al., 2009).
An alternative explanation for market accuracy, the MSH, relies on the evolu-
tionary argument that markets become accurate because they select for accurate
agents (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953). According to the MSH, agents with in-
accurate beliefs progressively lose their wealth to accurate agents. By standard
economic arguments, equilibrium prices are asymptotically accurate because they
reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent in the economy (Sandroni, 2000).
The MSH setting allows agents to disagree on the way to interpret information.
However, the selection result is far from encouraging. By selecting for a unique
most accurate agent, the market “destroys” all the accuracy gains that could be
achieved by pooling the diverse opinions of the agents who vanish. The market
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does not work as an aggregator, and no WOC can occur. Market prices can only
be as accurate as the most accurate agent (Blume and Easley, 2009), even in the
knife-edge cases in which there are multiple survivors (Jouini and Napp, 2011;
Massari, 2013). In addition to our model, others in the market selection liter-
ature allow for long-run survival of agents with heterogeneous beliefs. Survival
of agents with heterogeneous beliefs occurs in economies with incomplete mar-
kets (Beker and Chattopadhyay, 2010; Cogley et al., 2013; Cao, 2017), ambiguous
averse agents (Guerdjikova and Sciubba, 2015), exogenous saving rules (Bottazzi
and Dindo, 2014; Bottazzi et al., 2017), and recursive preferences (Borovicˇka, 2015;
Dindo, 2015). Unlike ours, however, these models do not deliver WOC because
there is no feedback between agent beliefs and equilibrium prices. A model that
merges elements of rational learning from prices and selection is Mailath and San-
droni (2003). This model does not endogenously generate WOC because long-run
heterogeneity is a consequence of the presence of noise traders.
Finally, the WOC argument (initially proposed by Galton, 1907, and recently
popularized by Surowiecki, 2005), hypothesizes that asset prices are accurate be-
cause the opposite, idiosyncratic errors of individual agents are averaged out by the
price formation mechanism. The WOC hypothesis has inspired a growing interest
in prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Arrow et al., 2008) and social
trading platforms (Chen et al., 2014; Pelster et al., 2017). Within the prediction
markets literature, most of the attention has been focused on static settings. How-
ever, there is no solid foundation to justify the WOC argument. WOC can occur
only if the consumption-shares/beliefs distribution is such that individual mistakes
cancel out. The main limitation of WOC is the lack of theoretical arguments sup-
porting that this is indeed the case. Further, there is evidence that even if agents
were rationally processing private unbiased signals, the aggregate beliefs might
be biased nevertheless (Ali, 1977; Manski, 2006; Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2014).
Works that also combine dynamic elements such as ours in prediction markets are
Kets et al. (2014) and Bottazzi and Giachini (2016). The WOC has also been
investigated within other contexts. In the literature of social learning in networks,
Golub and Jackson (2010) and Jadbabaie et al. (2012) provide conditions under
which agents imitating each other and naively updating their beliefs — using a
rule similar to ours — can achieve the same outcome of rational learning mod-
els. In the literature on collective problem-solving, Hong and Page (2004) explore
the trade-off between opinion diversity and the difficulty in identifying optimal
solutions (see also Page, 2007).
Our model brings together the contributions of these three branches of liter-
ature. Agents incorporate price in their beliefs, but not in a fully rational way;
the market selects against traders whose opinions are inaccurate, but only if those
trader beliefs cannot be used to increase market accuracy; and a dynamic WOC
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emerges: the market endogenously determines consumption shares that make the
average beliefs more accurate than that of the most accurate agent in isolation.
2 The model
We study a standard dynamic stochastic exchange economy with complete mar-
kets where agents have heterogeneous beliefs on the realizations of states of nature.
Assuming complete markets implies that agents can use contracts to exchange con-
tingent commodities for any date and any state. Since agents have heterogeneous
beliefs but are otherwise identical, they assign different evaluations for contingent
commodities and use the available assets to trade on such differences. Market
clearing determines equilibrium prices and allocations. At equilibrium, the agent
who assigns a higher probability to a certain event takes a long position (in excess
of his equilibrium consumption if beliefs were homogeneous) in the asset paying a
unit of the consumption good in that event. The agent with a lower probability
supplies the asset. We are interested in studying the resulting consumption-share
and asset-price dynamics and in characterizing their long-run properties. The
central question is if market probabilities, a proper normalization of asset prices,
become accurate.
Time is discrete, indexed by t, and begins at date t = 0. In each period
t ≥ 1, the economy can be in one of S mutually exclusive states, S. The set of
partial histories until t is the Cartesian product Σt = ×tS and the set of all paths is
Σ := ×∞S. σ = (σ1, ...) is a representative path, σt = (σ1, ..., σt) is a partial history
until period t, and Ft is the σ-algebra generated by the cylinders with base σ
t. By
construction {Ft} is a filtration and F is the σ-algebra generated by their union.
For any probability measure ρ on (Σ,F), ρ(σt) := ρ({σ1 × ...× σt × S × S × ...})
is the marginal probability of the partial history σt while ρ(σt|σt−1) = ρ(σt)ρ(σt−1) is
the conditional probability of σt given σ
t−1. ρt is the measure on (S, 2S) defined
by ρt := ρ(·|σt−1). P denotes the true probability measure on (Σ,F). We shall
assume that states of nature are i.i.d. with Pt = P for all t ≥ 1 for a measure P
on (S, 2S).1
Next, we introduce a number of economic variables with time index t. All these
variables are adapted to the information filtration {Ft}.
The economy contains I agents, I = {1, . . . , I}. For all paths σ, each agent
i ∈ I is endowed with a stream of the consumption good, (eit(σ))∞t=0. We take
the consumption good in t = 0 as the numera`ire of the economy. Each agent’s
objective is to maximize the stream of discounted expected utility he gets from
1With an abuse of notation, we are denoting with P both a measure on states and a measure
on sequences, depending on the context.
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consumption. Expectations are computed according to agent beliefs pi, a measure
on (Σ,F). Beliefs are heterogeneous and agents agree to disagree. Naming q(σt)
the date t = 0 price of the asset that delivers one unit of consumption in event σt
and none otherwise, agent i maximization reads:
max
(cit(σ))
∞
t=0
Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtui(cit(σ))
]
s.t.
∑
t≥0
∑
σt∈Σt
q(σt)
(
cit(σ)− eit(σ)
) ≤ 0.
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices and, for each agent, a con-
sumption plan that is preference maximal on the budget set, and such that markets
clear in every period: ∀(σ, t),∑i∈I eit(σ) = ∑i∈I cit(σ). Assumptions A1-A3 below
are taken to ensure that a unique competitive equilibrium exists (Peleg and Yaari,
1970) and that state prices aggregate the different views of the agents without
distortions (Rubinstein, 1974; Blume and Easley, 1993).2
A1 All agents have the same discount factor β, evaluate consumption using a
log utility, and can exchange a complete set of contracts.
A2 The aggregate endowment is constant:
∑
i∈I
eit(σ) = 1 for all t and σ.
A3 For all agents i ∈ I, all dates t and all events σt, pi(σt) > 0⇔ P (σt) > 0.
As it is customary in the market selection literature, the asymptotic fate of an
agent is characterized by his consumption-shares as follows.
Definition 2.1. Agent i vanishes if lim
t→∞
cit(σ) = 0 P -a.s., he survives if
lim sup
t→∞
cit(σ) > 0 P -a.s., he dominates if lim
t→∞
cit(σ) = 1 P -a.s..
2.1 Agent beliefs
We assume that each agent’s beliefs for next-period states are formed by giving
weight to two different models. The first model, market probabilities, is common to
all agents and coincides with the prediction implied by the market consensus. The
second model, dogmatic probabilities, is agent specific. For simplicity, we assume
that dogmatic probabilities pii are constant and that agents agree on the fact that
all states are possible (strict positivity).3 A natural choice for market probabilities
2Our analysis can be generalized to economies with non-log preferences and aggregate risk.
However, the mapping between beliefs and prices would be less transparent (Dindo, 2015; Mas-
sari, 2017).
3Most of our proofs generalize verbatim to the non-i.i.d. setting with minor notational changes
at the expense of less intuitive definitions. The strict positivity requirement for all measures can
also be relaxed.
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is the risk-neutral probabilities of the states because a representative agent exists
under A1-A3, and the risk-neutral probability of the states reflects his unbiased
beliefs (Rubinstein, 1974; Blume and Easley, 1993). The next lemma reminds the
reader of the analytic form of market probabilities.
Lemma 2.1. (Rubinstein, 1974). Under A1-A3, market probabilities are:
∀(t, σ),
{
pM(σt) =
∑
i∈I
pi(σt)ci0
pM(σt|σt−1) =
∑
i∈I p
i(σt|σt−1)cit−1(σ)
. (2.1)
We are now ready to define the beliefs of the agents in our economy.
Definition 2.2. For all i ∈ I, agent i beliefs are given by
∀(t, σ),
{
pi(σt) =
∏
τ≤t
pi(στ |στ−1)
pi(σt|σt−1) = (1− αi)pM(σt|σt−1) + αipii(σt)
; (2.2)
where pii is a strictly positive measure on (S, 2S) and αi ∈ (0, 1].4
This rule describes the attitude of an agent who partially believes that markets
are accurate. The parameter αi determines how much agent i believes in market
accuracy. Having αi = 1 represents the extreme scenario in which agent i ignores
the market. This is the standard case in the market selection literature, where most
of the models make the simplifying assumptions that agent beliefs are independent
of each other and of equilibrium prices. Whereas αi = 0 represents the case in
which agent i gives no weight to his dogmatic probabilities because he is certain
that markets are accurate — with a similar attitude to the economist who finds a
$20 bill lying on the ground and refuses to believe it. The intermediate cases of
αi ∈ (0, 1) are consistent with the attitude of an agent who biases his opinion in the
direction of the market consensus. This is a mental attitude that is consistent with
many known biases including anchoring (Shiller, 1999) and herding (Lakonishok
et al., 1992).
In the context of static prediction markets, rule 2.2 has been used to discuss
the effect of agents’ partial learning from equilibrium prices (Manski, 2006). In the
learning literature on networks, a similar rule is used by Jadbabaie et al. (2012),
while in the portfolio theory literature, beliefs (2.2) determine a portfolio that co-
incides with the Fractional-Kelly rule (MacLean et al., 2011; Kets et al., 2014), a
mixture between the Kelly portfolio (derived according to his dogmatic probabil-
ities) and the market portfolio. The Fractional-Kelly rule is often recommended
because it reduces the volatility of the Kelly rule and yet ensures a high growth
4We rule out αi = 0 because αi = 0 for all i ∈ I leads to an indeterminate equilibrium.
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rate of capital. Moreover, its hedging properties meet the reputation incentives of
the professional investors: Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation
to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally (Keynes, 1936).
We conclude this section by reassuring the reader that if agent beliefs satisfy
Definition 2.2, then the competitive equilibrium exists and is unique — because A3
is satisfied. Moreover, on every equilibrium path, both market probabilities and
agent beliefs belong to the convex combination of agents dogmatic probabilities
(see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A).
3 Agents accuracy and survival
In this section, we formally define accuracy and discuss how it affects agents sur-
vival. Following an established tradition in the market selection literature (Blume
and Easley, 1992), we use the average (conditional) relative entropies (Kullback-
Leibler divergences), to rank agents’ accuracy.
Definition 3.1. The average relative entropy between a probability pi and the true
probability P is
d¯(P ||pi) := lim
t→∞
1
t
∑t
τ=1 d(P ||piτ ),5
where, for all τ , d(P ||piτ ) := EP
[
ln P (στ )
pi(στ |στ−1)
]
.
Definition 3.2. Agent i is more accurate than agent j if d¯(P ||pi) < d¯(P ||pj), P -a.s..
Agent i is as accurate as agent j if d¯(P ||pi) = d¯(P ||pj), P -a.s..
The average relative entropy is uniquely minimized at pi = P, strictly convex,
and d(P ||pi) = d¯(P ||pi) whenever P and pi are constant over time. This notion of
accuracy is commonly adopted in the selection literature because of its straightfor-
ward implications on agents survival. Under reasonable assumptions, the simple
comparison of agents’ relative entropy delivers a sufficient condition for an agent
to vanish.
Proposition 3.1. (Sandroni, 2000). Under A1-A3, agent i vanishes if there
exists an agent j ∈ I who is more accurate:
d¯(P ||pj) < d¯(P ||pi) P -a.s.⇒ Agent i vanishes.
5Lemma 6.1.2, pg.133, of Gray (2010) guarantees that this limit exists P -a.s. — ergodic
property. The average relative entropy has the ergodic property because (i) i.i.d. states of nature
imply that all indicator functions on (Σ,F) have the ergodic property and (ii) the conditional
relative entropy of market probabilities, and thus also of agent beliefs, is a bounded measurement
on (Σ,F).
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An alternative approach to studying agents survival is to directly compare
agents’ relative entropy against that of market probabilities (Massari, 2017). This
general approach can be used to deliver a sufficient condition for an agent to vanish
that is directly informative about the accuracy of market probabilities.6
Proposition 3.2. Under A1-A3,
(a) no agent can be more accurate than the market:
∀i ∈ I, d¯(P ||pi) ≥ d¯(P ||pM) P -a.s.;
(b) agent i survives only if he is as accurate as the market:
Agent i survives⇒ d¯(P ||pi) = d¯(P ||pM) P -a.s..
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2 significantly simplifies our analysis because standard techniques
to approximate market probabilities and agents’ relative entropies cannot be used
when agent beliefs endogenously depend on equilibrium prices. Definition 2.2
generates beliefs that are path-dependent and not exchangeable — that is, no
statistics of the data is informative enough to characterize the dynamics of our
system. Most of our results are obtained by combining Propositions 3.1 and 3.2,
and by taking advantage of the convexity of the relative entropy.
3.1 A definition of Wisdom of the Crowd
We say that WOC occurs if market probabilities are more accurate than the beliefs
of the most accurate agent in isolation. Two quantities play a special role in our
definition: the Best Individual Probability (piBIP ), which is the most accurate
dogmatic probability, and the Best Collective Probability (piBCP ), which is the
most accurate combination of agents’ dogmatic probabilities. Moreover, we say
that dogmatic probabilities are diverse when the Best Collective Probability differs
from the Best Individual Probability — that is, if it is possible to combine dogmatic
probabilities into a prediction that is more accurate than that of all dogmatic
probabilities.
Definition 3.3. Given a set of dogmatic probabilities {pi1, ...piI}:
• the Best Individual Probabilitys is: piBIP = argmin
p∈{pi1,...,piI}
d¯(P ||p);
6Massari (2017)’s condition for an agent to vanish is both necessary and sufficient. The
necessary part of Massari (2017)’s condition is lost here because we are using relative entropy
comparisons rather than likelihood ratios.
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• the Best Collective Probabilitys is: piBCP = argmin
p∈Conv(pi1,...,piI)
d¯(P ||p);
• dogmatic probabilities are diverse when piBCP 6= piBIP .
WOC occurs if market probabilities are more accurate than the beliefs of the
most accurate agent in isolation. By Lemma 2.1 and beliefs (2.2), when an agent
is alone in the economy, both his beliefs and market probabilities coincide with
his dogmatic probabilities. Thus, we can say that WOC occurs when market
probabilities are more accurate than piBIP .
Definition 3.4. Under A1-A3, we say that WOC occurs if market probabilities
are more accurate than the most accurate dogmatic probability:
d¯(P ||pM) < d¯(P ||piBIP ) P -a.s..
To gain intuition, consider a two-state, S = {u, d}, two-agent, I = {1, 2}, economy.
The true probability of state u is, P (u) = .5. Agent 1 is pessimistic about u,
his dogmatic probability is pi1(u) = .4 < P (u); while agent 2 is optimistic, his
dogmatic probability is pi2(u) = .7 > P (u). Clearly, agent 1 has the most accurate
dogmatic probabilities, thus piBIP = pi1 = .4; while the most accurate way to
combine the dogmatic probabilities of the two agents is piBCP = 1
2
= P . WOC
occurs if market probabilities are more accurate than the dogmatic probability of
agent 1 (and thus 2) — in other words, if the market consensus is more accurate
than all market participants in isolation.
The following Proposition shows that, irrespective of the mixing coefficients
of agents, market probabilities are at least as accurate as piBIP and at most as
accurate as piBCP . If WOC does not occur, selection forces ensure that market
probabilities are as accurate as piBIP . Otherwise, piBCP represents an upper bound
on market accuracy.
Proposition 3.3. Under A1-A3, for every choice of αi ∈ (0, 1] for all i ∈ I, the
market is at least as accurate as piBIP and at most as accurate as piBCP :
d¯(P ||piBCP ) ≤ d¯(P ||pM) ≤ d¯(P ||piBIP ), P-a.s..
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.3 is proven showing that in the long-run either the agent with
the most accurate dogmatic probabilities dominates, and market probabilities are
as accurate as piBIP , or there is long-run heterogeneity, and market probabilities
are a convex combination of the surviving agents’ dogmatic probabilities — thus,
by Definition 3.3, at most as accurate as piBCP .
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4 Main results
4.1 Necessary conditions for WOC
In this section, we establish two necessary conditions for WOC.
Proposition 4.1. Under A1-A3, WOC can occur only if agent beliefs depend on
prices.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Most of the results in the market selection literature do not generate WOC
because they assume that agent beliefs are independent of each other and equilib-
rium prices. Under this assumption, the selection result is only partially positive
because it creates a tension between selection and long-run survival of agents with
heterogeneous beliefs. If one of the agents knows the true probability, market
probabilities converge to his beliefs and become accurate. Otherwise, the market,
by selecting the most accurate agent, destroys all potential accuracy gains that
could be achieved by mixing the incorrect beliefs of agents with opposite biases
(Jouini and Napp, 2011; Massari, 2017).
For example, suppose the market has an optimistic and a pessimistic agent. If
the pessimistic agent is less accurate than the optimist, then the pessimist vanishes,
and market probabilities become optimistic. Clearly, this is not the best way to
make use of agent opinions. A better way would be to redistribute consumption-
shares in such a way that market probabilities become accurate by balancing the
opposite biases of the two agents. However, this is impossible when agents’ beliefs
are independent of each other because only the most accurate trader survives
(Blume and Easley, 2009).
Proposition 4.2. Under A1-A3, WOC can occur only if dogmatic probabilities
are diverse.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result implies that no WOC can occur if there is an agent whose belief
accuracy cannot be improved by mixing his dogmatic probabilities with those of
other agents. For example, in an economy with two states in which all dogmatic
probabilities are biased in the same way, no WOC can occur because the most ac-
curate combination of agent beliefs, piBCP , is the one obtained by giving all wealth
to the least biased among the agents (BIP). Another implication of Proposition
4.2 is that no WOC can occur if there is an agent whose dogmatic probabilities
coincide with the truth. In this case, piBIP = P and mixing agent BIP beliefs with
those of the others can only compromise his accuracy.
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4.2 Sufficient conditions for WOC
The WOC occurs if the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied. First,
it must be possible to achieve accuracy gains by balancing the different opin-
ions of market participants — in other words, dogmatic probabilities must be
diverse. Second, agents must believe strongly enough in market accuracy — αi
must be small for all agents i ∈ I. Under these conditions, selection forces induce
a non-degenerate consumption-share distribution, which guarantees that market
probabilities are more accurate than the most accurate agent in isolation.
Proposition 4.3. Under A1-A3, provided that dogmatic probabilities are diverse,
there exists an α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if αi < α¯ for all i ∈ I, then WOC occurs and
at least two agents survive.
Proof. See Appendix A.
For intuition, consider again an economy with two states, S = {u, d}, and
two agents I = {1, 2}. The true probability of state u is P (u) = .5. Agent 1
is pessimistic about u, while agent 2 is optimistic. Their dogmatic probabilities
are pi1(u) = .4 and pi2(u) = .7, respectively. As we noted earlier piBIP (u) = .4 6=
.5 = piBCP (u) = P (u). Thus, agent beliefs are diverse and it is possible to achieve
accuracy gains by mixing their opinions.
Figure 1 [top] shows that long-run heterogeneity and WOC occurs if agents
give enough weight to market probabilities. With α1 = α2 = .2, we have long-
run heterogeneity and WOC because the dependency of trader beliefs on market
probabilities makes it impossible for any trader to dominate. When agent 1 (2)
consumption-shares become large, his dogmatic probabilities have a large impact
on market probabilities, making his beliefs less accurate than those of agent 2
(1). Thus, consumption-shares never find a resting point, market probabilities
remain close to P and are more accurate than piBIP . Formally, the consumption-
shares are mean-reverting processes around the value c¯1 that determines a market
probability p¯M which makes agents 1 and 2 equally accurate (i.e. c1t R c¯1 ⇔
d(P ||p1t ) R d(P ||p2t )). WOC occurs because p¯M is more accurate than pi1 and pi2,
and market probabilities stay close to p¯M a large enough number of periods.
Conversely, Figure 1 [bottom] shows that if agents do not give enough weight
to market probabilities WOC does not occur because only one agent survives.
With α2 = .9, agent 2 vanishes because he is less accurate than agent 1 for every
consumption-share distribution: ∀c1t , d(P ||p2t ) > d(P ||pi1t ). This can be verified by
noticing that agent 2’s beliefs are less accurate than agent 1’s even when agent
1 dominates and sets equilibrium prices equal to his dogmatic probabilities pi1:
p2|pM=pi1 = .1(.4) + .9(.7) = .67⇒ d(P ||p2|pM=pi1) > d(P ||pi1).
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Figure 1: Consumption-shares [left] and market probability [right] dynamics in two economies
with identical, diverse dogmatic probabilities, P (u) = piBCP (u) = .5 6= piBIP (u) = .4. and
different mixing coefficients. [Top]: agents believe enough in market accuracy, α1 = α2 = .2, and
WOC occurs. Consumption-shares never find a resting point, and market probabilities are more
accurate than piBIP . [Bottom]: agents do not believe enough in market accuracy, α1=α2=.9, and
no WOC occurs. Agent 1 dominates, and market probabilities are as accurate as his dogmatic
probabilities.
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4.3 Accurate markets: A self-fulfilling prophecy
Here we demonstrate that if agents in the economy are (almost) sure that markets
are accurate, then markets are indeed (almost) accurate. By strongly relying on
market probabilities, agents generate a virtuous interaction that makes both their
beliefs and the market more accurate: selection forces endogenously find the best
way to aggregate the diverse opinions of agents.
Theorem 4.1. Let (Eα) be a family of economies that satisfies A1-A3 with α
i =
α for all i ∈ I and name each economy market probabilities process (pMα ). All
economies have two states7 and are identical in all respects except the value of
agent mixing coefficients, α. The following result holds P -a.s.:
lim
α→0
d¯(P ||pMα ) = d¯(P ||piBCP ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1 is proven by showing that, (i) a lower α implies that the point
p¯M where the market belief process reverts its drift is closer to piBCP . And (ii),
for every interval around p¯M , α can be chosen small enough to ensure that the
market belief process spends most of its period in that interval. The difficulty in
proving the result is that a lower α implies a lower variance, but also a weaker
mean-reverting drift of the market probability process — the selection forces are
weaker because agent beliefs become more similar. Thus, we have to determine
which effect dominates when α is small. To make things worse, the per-period
variances and drifts changes over time and are path-dependent. We prove that
the accuracy gain for a more accurate mean-reverting point and a lower variance
of the market probability process more than compensates for the accuracy loss
due to weaker mean-reverting forces. Although market probabilities take longer
to reach piBCP , they are nevertheless more accurate because they remain closer to
piBCP after they reach it.
Figure 2 illustrates the result by showing the consumption-share dynamics and
the frequency of market probabilities of four economies that only differ in their
value of α. All economies have two agents with dogmatic probabilities pi1(u) = .4
and pi2(u) = .7, so that piBCP = P 6= piBIP = pi1. As per Proposition 4.1, when
α = 1, no WOC occurs: prices are as accurate as pi1. As per Proposition 4.3,
for α low enough, no agent dominates and market probability are more accurate
than pi1. In this specific example, α = 0.2 is already beyond the threshold α¯. As
per Theorem 4.1, for α = .001 ≈ 0 the market probabilities distribution becomes
7For tractability reasons, we restrict our analysis to two-state economies. Our proof suggests
that this result should hold also in economies with more than two states.
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Figure 2: Consumption-share dynamics [left] and market belief frequencies [right] in four
economies with true probability P (u) = .5, two agents with dogmatic probabilities pi1(u) = .4
and pi2(u) = .7, and four different values of α. The figure shows that a smaller α determines
market belief frequencies that are more concentrated around the truth. Market beliefs empirical
frequencies
concentrated in a small interval around piBCP , which makes prices almost as accu-
rate as the truth. If agents strongly believe that the market is accurate, then the
market is indeed accurate.
5 Agents survival and WOC
The two main assumptions that enable markets to successfully combine agent be-
liefs are: dogmatic probabilities are diverse, and the mixing coefficient α is positive
and small. In this section, we explore the role of the two assumptions on agents
survival and on WOC. First, we characterize the role of α on agents survival and
accuracy. Caeteris paribus, a lower α determines higher accuracy and increases an
agent survival chances. Second, we appraise the role of diversity among dogmatic
probabilities. Agents survival is determined not only by the accuracy of their dog-
matic probabilities but also by the contribution of their dogmatic probabilities to
the diversity of the market. Selection forces eliminate the agents whose dogmatic
probabilities cannot be used to improve market accuracy because they are collinear
with those of other agents. Lastly, we show that if agents were to use Bayes’ rule
to learn the weight α, then the WOC would be destroyed. Markets populated by
Bayesian learners are less accurate than markets populated by agents who trust
the market but are unwilling to completely relinquish their own opinion.
5.1 The role of α on the accuracy of agents
In this section, we show that giving positive weight to market probabilities weakly
increases agents’ accuracy. For every P , for every investment strategy adopted by
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other agents, and for every dogmatic probability pii, agent i’s beliefs are (weakly)
more accurate if he gives positive weight to market probabilities than if he does
not.
Proposition 5.1. Under A1-A3, for all agents i ∈ I and for all αi ∈ (0, 1)
d¯(P ||pi) ≤ d¯(P ||pii) P-a.s.;
with equality if lim
t→∞
pM(·|σt−1) = pii(·).
Proof. See Appendix A.
A skeptical reader might argue that if an agent has the correct beliefs, then he
should not form beliefs according to (2.2). Proposition 5.1 tells us that, even in this
case, the average accuracy of an agent is not reduced. The reason is that if agent
i’s dogmatic probabilities are correct, he dominates and price probability converges
to the truth. Because convergence of price probability is fast, his average accuracy
is not affected. In terms of consumption paths, an agent with correct dogmatic
probabilities who adopts our rule has a slower growth rate of consumption-shares
than that of an agent with correct beliefs who does not rely on market probabilities.
However, the consumption-share volatility of the former is lower than that of the
latter.
Remark: The proof of Proposition 5.1 does not require pii or P to be i.i.d.
measures. Thus, pii could be chosen to be a learning process representing all the
information that agent i can process rationally. Proposition 5.1 implies that, even
in this case, each agent’s accuracy is weakly increased by mixing it with market
probabilities. The reason is that rule 2.2 represents a hedge against model mis-
specification. If pii represents rational learning according to the correct model
and using all available information, agent i’s average accuracy is not diminished
by mixing with market probabilities since market probability converges to pii fast
because he dominates. Otherwise, agent i’s belief accuracy increases by mixing
with market probabilities because his subjective probabilistic model of the world
is incorrect and no amount of information suffices to make his beliefs rational.
5.2 The role of α on agents survival
Although there is a link between agent accuracy and survival, Proposition 5.1
cannot be used to make direct claims on agents survival. The reason is that
changing even a single αi alters all the properties of the equilibrium, including
the beliefs of all agents. Here we provide a more direct argument showing that
mixing with market probabilities gives a (weakly) monotonic survival advantage
to an agent. If two agents have identical dogmatic probabilities, then the agent
who believes less in market accuracy vanishes whenever WOC occurs.
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Figure 3: Consumption-share dynamics in a market with two states, three agents with
[pi1(u), pi2(u), pi3(u)] = [.4, .7, .4] and truth P (u) = .5. [Left]: [α1, α2, α3] = [.2, .2, .5]. When
agent 2 is mixing, WOC occurs. Market probabilities are more accurate than pi1 = pi3 = piBIP
and agent 3 vanishes because he mixes less than agent 1. [Right]: [α1, α2, α3] = [.2, 1, .5]. When
agent 2 is not mixing, no WOC occurs. Market probabilities are as accurate as pi1 = pi3 = piBIP
and agent 3 survives.
Proposition 5.2. Under A1-A3, when WOC occurs, agent j vanishes if there
exists an agent i such that pij = pii and αi < αj.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If WOC occurs, price probabilities are more accurate than all dogmatic prob-
abilities. Therefore, giving more weight to market probability monotonically in-
creases the accuracy of agent beliefs, thus providing an evolutionary advantage
[Figure 3, left]. Conversely, there might be no accuracy gain when there is no WOC.
For example, consider two agents with identical dogmatic probabilities which co-
incide with piBIP . If no WOC occurs, market probabilities converge to piBIP fast
and both agents survive because their beliefs become identical [Figure 3, right].
5.3 The role of belief diversity on agents survival
How important is it to have accurate dogmatic probabilities? The diversity re-
quirement, piBIP 6= piBCP , indicates that the answer to this question is not that
simple. Agents survival is determined not only by the accuracy of their dogmatic
probabilities but also by the contribution of their dogmatic probabilities to the di-
versity of the market. The next proposition shows that the market selects against
inaccurate traders whose beliefs do not contribute to market accuracy.
Proposition 5.3. Under A1-A3, agent j vanishes if there exist agent i and
γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(i) pii = (1− γ)P + γpij and (ii) αi ≤ αj.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Condition (i) tells us that selection forces eliminate agents with redundant
opinions from the market. Agents whose dogmatic probabilities are a convex
combination of the truth and another agent’s beliefs vanish because their beliefs do
not contribute to market diversity. Condition (ii) requires that the agent with the
most accurate dogmatic probabilities mixes at least as much as the least accurate
agent. This condition prevents the case in which market probabilities get closer
to the true measure than pii and agent j becomes more accurate than agent i by
giving more weight to market probabilities.
Proposition 5.3 implies a relation between the maximal number of surviving
agents and the dimensionality of the state space: the maximal number of surviving
agents is at least as large as the number of states. In markets with two states, the
maximal number of surviving agents is two because agents can add diversity to
market probabilities only along one dimension. The surviving agent candidates are
the ones with the most accurate beliefs on the two sides of the true probability —
that is, the least pessimistic among the pessimistic agents and the least optimistic
among the optimistic agents.
Corollary 5.1. Under A1-A3, if S = {u, d}, all agents have the same α, and
WOC occurs, then only two agents survive. These are i = argmaxi∈I{pii(u) <
P (u)} and i¯ = argmini∈I{pii(u) > P (u)}.
Proof. Application of Proposition 5.3.
Figure 4 illustrates Corollary 5.1. Two cases are presented, one in which all
agents use α = .2 [left panel] and one in which all agents use α = 0.05 [right
panel]. The simulation shows that in both cases the agents with more extreme
dogmatic probabilities vanish. Although a higher weight on market probabilities
makes the agents with extreme dogmatic probabilities more accurate, and thus
slows down their vanishing rate considerably, in both cases, only the agents with
more accurate dogmatic probabilities survive.
We conclude with a corollary showing that an agent who does not rely on
market probabilities vanishes whenever WOC occurs. The result illustrates the
trade-off between the value of αi and the accuracy of agent i’s dogmatic probabil-
ities. It shows that relying on market probabilities can compensate for having less
accurate dogmatic probabilities than other agents (see Figure 5 for an illustration).
Corollary 5.2. Under A1-A3, if αi = 1 and WOC occurs, then agent i vanishes.
Proof. These inequalities hold P -a.s.:
d¯(P ||pM ) <WOC occurs d¯(P ||piBIP ) ≤ d¯(P ||pii) =αi=1⇔pii=pi d¯(P ||pi)⇒By Prop.3.2 i vanishes.
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Figure 4: Consumption-share dynamics in a two-state economy with P (u) = .5 and four
agents with dogmatic probabilities [pi1(u), pi2(u), pi3(u), pi4(u)] = [.4, .7, .2, .8] and identical mixing
coefficient α = .2 [left] and α = .05 [right]. Irrespective of the value of the mixing coefficients,
only the least pessimistic and the least optimistic agents survive.
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Figure 5: Consumption-share [left] and market probability dynamics [right] in a two-state,
three-agent economy with P (u)=.5, [pi1(u), pi2(u), pi3(u)]=[.4, .7, .55] and [α1, α2, α3] = [.1, .1, 1].
WOC occurs because the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 are diverse and they give enough weight to
market probabilities. Although agent 3 has the most accurate dogmatic probability, he vanishes
because he does not believe in market accuracy.
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5.4 No WOC with Bayesian traders
In the previous section, we showed that a small α favors agents survival and it
makes the market more accurate. Here we add a layer of sophistication to our
belief formation rule. We discuss the case in which agents use Bayes’ rule to learn
how much weight to give to the market probability component of their beliefs.
Definition 5.1. For all i ∈ I, agent i beliefs are Bayesian if
∀(t, σ), pi(σt|σt−1) =
(
1− αit−1(σt−1)
)
pM(σt|σt−1) + αit−1(σt−1)pii(σt)
where αi0 ∈ (0, 1) and αit−1(σt−1) := α0pi
i(σt−1)
(1−α0)pM (σt−1)+α0pii(σt−1) .
This layer of sophistication favors agents survival but destroys the WOC. In
economies in which all agents use Bayes’ rule to update the relative weight they
attach to market probabilities, all agents survive, but no WOC occurs. Instead,
the beliefs of all agents coordinate on the most accurate dogmatic probabilities.
Proposition 5.4. Under A1-A3, if all agents’ beliefs are Bayesian
(a) all agents in the market survive in every sequence;
(b) no WOC occurs and lim
t→∞
pM(·|σt−1) = piBIP (·), P -a.s..
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the first step of the proof, we show that market probabilities are qualitatively
equivalent to the probabilities obtained via Bayes’ rule from a prior on the set of
dogmatic probabilities. Because the support of market probability coincides with
the set of dogmatic probabilities, the market is as accurate as the most accurate
dogmatic probability (Berk, 1966; Marinacci and Massari, 2017). The agent with
the most accurate dogmatic probabilities learns that his model is more accurate
than the market and eventually uses only his dogmatic probabilities to form be-
liefs.8 All other agents learn that the market is more accurate than their dogmatic
probabilities and eventually their beliefs coincide with those of the market. Be-
cause the convergence is fast, no agent vanishes. Because all agent beliefs converge
to the most accurate dogmatic probability, there is no WOC.
8More precisely, his model is more accurate than the market’s in every finite horizon but
coincides with that of the market asymptotically.
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6 Conclusion
MSH and WOC can be reconciled in a dynamic economy where agent beliefs are
diverse and partially learn from prices. When agents strongly believe in market
accuracy, and the market has diverse opinions, a virtuous self-fulling prophecy
occurs. Although no agent knows the truth, market selection forces endogenously
generate consumption-share dynamics which determine market probabilities that
are almost as accurate as the most accurate combination of agents’ opinions that
is achievable. This positive result is destroyed if agents learn in a Bayesian fashion
whether their dogmatic probability is more accurate than that of the market. In
economies in which all agents use Bayes’ rule to update the relative weight they
attach to market probabilities, all agents survive, but no WOC occurs.
A Appendix
Lemma A.1. Under A1-A2, if agents’ beliefs are as in definition (2.2) with arbitrary
αi ∈ (0, 1) then A3 is satisfied and ∀(t, σ),∀j ∈ I ∪M,pj(σt|σt−1) ∈ Conv(pi1, ..., piI);
where Conv(pi1, ..., piI) is the Convex Hull of the set {pi1, ..., piI}.
Proof. Substituting pi(σt|σt−1) in the equilibrium price equation (Eq.2.1),
∀(t, σ), pM (σt|σt−1) =
∑
i∈I
[
(1− αi)pM (σt|σt−1) + αipii(σt)
]
cit−1(σ).
Rearranging,
∀(t, σ), pM (σt|σt−1) =
∑
i∈I
pii(σt)
αicit−1(σ)∑
j∈I αic
i
t−1(σ)
∈ Conv(pi1, ..., piI). (A.1)
pi(σt|σt−1) ∈ Conv(pi1, ..., piI) because it is the convex combination of two points in
Conv(pi1, ..., piI). A3 is satisfied because pi(σt|σt−1) ∈ Conv(pi1, ..., piI) and pii being
strictly positive ∀ i ∈ I ⇒ pi(σt|σt−1) 6= 0 ∀(t, σ) and ∀ i ∈ I.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof.
(a) : ∀i ∈ I, pM (σt) =By Eq.2.1
∑
i∈I
pi(σt)ci0
⇒ ln pM (σt) ≥ ln pi(σt) + ln ci0
⇒ 1
t
ln
P (σt)
pM (σt)
≤ 1
t
ln
P (σt)
pi(σt)
− 1
t
ln ci0
⇒ lim
t→∞
[
1
t
[
t∑
τ=1
ln
P (στ )
pM (στ |στ−1) −
t∑
τ=1
d(P ||pMτ )
]
+
1
t
t∑
τ=1
d(P ||pMτ )
]
≤ lim
t→∞
[
1
t
[
t∑
τ=1
ln
P (στ )
pi(στ |στ−1) −
t∑
τ=1
d(P ||piτ )
]
+
1
t
t∑
τ=1
d(P ||piτ )−
1
t
ln ci0
]
⇒∗ d¯(P ||pM ) ≤ d¯(P ||pi) P -a.s..
(∗) follows from noticing that, for j = i,M, lim
t→∞
1
t
[∑t
τ=1 ln
P (στ )
pj(στ |στ−1) −
∑t
τ=1 d(P ||pjτ )
]
= 0,
P -a.s. as implied by the Strong Law of Large Number for Martingale Differences (SLLNMD)(as
shown also in Sandroni, 2000).
(b): We proceed by proving the contrapositive statement: d¯(P ||pi) > d¯(P ||pM ) P -a.s.⇒ agent i
vanishes — the opposite inequality is ruled out by (a).
Note that, for all (t, σ), the FOC and market clearing imply,
cit(σ) =
pi(σt)
pM (σ)
ci0
⇔ 1
t
ln cit(σ) =
1
t
ln
pi(σt)
pM (σt)
+
1
t
ln ci0
=
1
t
[
ln
P (σt)
pM (σt)
− ln P (σ
t)
pi(σt)
]
+
1
t
ln ci0
Proceeding as in (a), we obtain lim
t→∞
1
t ln c
i
t(σ) = d¯(P ||pM )− d¯(P ||pi) P -a.s., by the SLLNMD
Therefore, d¯(P ||pi) > d¯(P ||pM ) P -a.s.⇒ 1
t
ln cit(σ) < 0, P -a.s.
⇔ ln cit(σ)→ −∞, P -a.s.
⇔ cit → 0 : agent i vanishes.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. d¯(P ||pM ) ≤By Prop.3.2 d¯(P ||pBIP ) ≤By Prop.5.1 d¯(P ||piBIP ) , P -a.s..
Moreover, ∀σ, d¯(P ||piBCP ) ≤ d¯(P ||pM ) because piBCP := argmin
p∈Conv(pi1,...,piI)
d(P ||p) and
∀(t, σ), pMt ∈By Lem.A.1 Conv(pi1, ..., piI).
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Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. We prove the contrapositive statement:
αi = 1 ∀i ∈ I⇒ d¯(P ||pM ) = d¯(P ||piBIP ) P -a.s.⇔ no WOC.
First note that αi = 1 ∀i ∈ I⇒ pi(σt) = pii(σt),∀i,∀(σ, t). The result follows by noticing
that by Proposition 3.1 only the most accurate agent, piBIP , survives and by Proposition
3.2 the market is as accurate as every agent that survive.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. We prove the contrapositive statement:
piBCP = piBIP ⇒ d¯(P ||pM ) = d¯(P ||piBIP ) P -a.s.⇔ no WOC,
which follows noticing that, for every choice of αi ∈ (0, 1] for all i ∈ I,
d¯(P ||piBIP ) ≥By Prop.5.1 d¯(P ||pBIP ) ≥By Prop.3.2 d¯(P ||pM ) ≥ d¯(P ||piBCP ) = d¯(P ||piBIP ).
The last inequality follows because ∀(t, σ), pMt ∈By Lem.A.1 Conv(pi1, ..., piI)⇒ ∀(t, σ), d(P ||pMt ) ≥
d(P ||piBCP ). Summing and averaging over t gives the result.
In order to prove Proposition 4.3 we need these two Lemmas.
Lemma A.2. Under A1-A3,
piBIP 6= piBCP ⇒ ∃ j ∈ I : ∇d(P ||piBIP ) · (pij − piBIP ) < 0
Proof. By contradiction suppose that for all i ∈ I
∇d(P ||piBIP ) · (pii − piBIP ) ≥ 0 (A.2)
By linearity of the scalar product, eq. (A.2) implies that for every p¯i ∈ Conv(pi1, ..., piI)
∇d(P ||piBIP ) · (p¯i − piBIP ) ≥ 0.
As a result, piBCP ∈ Conv(pi1, ..., piI) implies
∇d(P ||piBIP ) · (piBCP − piBIP ) ≥ 0. (A.3)
Convexity and smoothness of the K-L divergence imply that for all γ
d(P ||piBIP + γ(piBCP − piBIP )) ≥ d(P ||piBIP ) + γ∇d(P ||piBIP ) · (piBCP − piBIP ).
In particular, taking γ = 1 and using eq. (A.3) gives
d(P ||piBCP ) ≥ d(P ||piBIP ),
a contradiction.
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Lemma A.3. Under A1-A3,
piBIP 6= piBCP ⇒ ∃ α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀i ∈ I, αi ∈ (0, α¯) implies lim
t→∞ p
M
t 6= piBIP P -a.s..
Proof. By contradiction, assume
(i) piBIP 6= piBCP
and
(ii) ∀α¯ ∈ (0, 1) and ∀i ∈ I αi ∈ (0, α¯) implies ∀ > 0 ∃T such that ∀t > T ||pMt − piBIP || <  P -a.s..
We shall prove two intermediate results.
First, (ii)⇒ d¯(P ||piBIP ) = d¯(P ||pM ) P -a.s. (A.4)
By continuity of the K-L divergence,
lim
t→∞ p
M
t = pi
BIP P -a.s. ⇒ lim
t→∞ d(P ||p
M
t )− d(P ||piBIP ) = 0 P -a.s..
Let gt =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
[
d(P ||pMτ )− d(P ||piBIP )
]
.
Cesa`ro theorem (e.g. Williams, 1991, pg.116) implies that d¯(P ||piBIP ||P )−d¯(P ||pM ||P ) :=
lim
t→∞ gt = 0 P -a.s..
Second, (i) and (ii)⇒ ∃j ∈ I : d¯(P ||piBIP ) > d¯(P ||pj) P -a.s. (A.5)
By Lemma A.2, (i) guarantees that there exists a j ∈ I such that
∇d(P ||piBIP ) · (pij − piBIP ) < 0. (A.6)
Rewrite pjt as p
j
t = pi
BIP + αj(pij − piBIP ) + (1− αj)(pMt − piBIP ).
Computing the K-L divergence of beliefs pjt and expanding around pi
BIP gives
d(P ||pjt ) = d(P ||piBIP + αj(pij − piBIP ) + (1− αj)(pMt − piBIP )))
= d(P ||piBIP + αj((pij − piBIP ) + (1− α
j)
αj
(pMt − piBIP )))
= d(P ||piBIP ) + αj∇d(P ||piBIP ) ·
(
(pij − piBIP ) + (1− α
j)
αj
(pMt − piBIP )
)
+ o(αj).
The above equality, together with (A.6) and (ii) implies that P -a.s. there exists a α¯
such that for all αj < α¯ there exists a T (αj) and a δ > 0 such that for all t > T (αj)
d(P ||pjt ) < d(P ||piBIP )− δ.
(A.5) is now proven by summing over t and averaging.
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Finally, the Lemma follows from noticing that (A.4) and (A.5) imply that
∃j ∈ I,∃α¯ > 0 : α ∈ (0, α¯)⇒ d¯(P ||pM ) = d¯(P ||piBIP ) > d¯(P ||pj) P -a.s.,
Contradicting Prop. 3.2 (a) which states that ∀j ∈ I, d¯(P ||pM ) ≤ d¯(P ||pj) P -a.s..
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Under A1-A3,
piBIP 6= piBCP ⇒ ∃α¯ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀i ∈ I, αi < α¯⇒ d¯(P ||pM ) < d¯(P ||piBIP ) P -a.s..
Proof. Under the stated assumptions
d¯(P ||pM ) ≤By Prop.3.2 d¯(P ||pBIP ) ≤By Prop.5.1 d¯(P ||piBIP ) P -a.s..
By strict convexity of the K-L divergence, these inequalities are strict unless:
(i) lim
t→∞ p
M
t = pi
BIP ; or (ii) ∀i ∈ Iα = 0; or (iii) ∀i ∈ Iαi = 1 — which implies
d¯(P ||pM ) = d¯(P ||piBIP ).
The result follows by noticing that cases (ii) and (iii) are ruled out by assumption; and
that case (i) is ruled out by Lemma A.3 when α is small enough.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof. ∀(t, σ),
d(P ||pit) = d(P ||(1− αi)pMt + αipii))
≤a (1− αi)d(P ||pMt ) + αd(P ||pii) ; by strict convexity of d(P ||·)
⇒ d¯(P ||pi) ≤ (1− αi)d¯(P ||pM ) + αid¯(P ||pii) ; summing and averaging over t
⇒ d¯(P ||pi) ≤ d¯(P ||pii) P -a.s. ; Because d¯(P ||pM ) ≤by Prop.3.2 d¯(P ||pi)
We now prove that equality holds if pMt → pii.
Given that inequality (a) is strict unless pMt (σ) = pi
i, continuity of d(P ||·) and pMt (σ)→
pii ⇒ d(P ||pMt )→ d(P ||pii). Applying the Cesa`ro theorem (e.g. Williams, 1991, pg.116)
to the definition of d¯(P ||pi) leads to d¯(P ||pi) = d¯(P ||pii).
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof. By assumption WOC occurs, pii = pij = pi and αi < αj . Thus, ∀(t, σ),
pit = (1− λ)pM + λpj ; with λ =
αi
αj
⇒d(P ||pit) ≤a (1− λ)d(P ||pMt ) + λd(P ||pjt ) ; By strict convexity of the K-L divergence
⇒d¯(P ||pi) ≤b (1− λ)d¯(P ||pM ) + λd¯(P ||pj) ; Rearranging, summing and averaging over t
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If inequality (b) is strict, rearranging we obtain d¯(P ||pi) < d¯(P ||pj) and agent j vanishes
by Proposition 3.1.
Inequality (b) is strict by the following argument.
(a) holds with equality iff pit = p
j
t at t; that is, iff p
i
t = p
j
t = p
M
t = pi at t. Thus, by Cesa`ro
theorem (b) holds with equality only if pit, p
j
t , p
M
t converge to pi. Which contradicts our
initial assumption that WOC occurs.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof. By assumption, αi ≤ αj and pii = (1− γ)P + γpij for a γ ∈ (0, 1).
For all t, let p¯t := (1− αi)pMt + αiP . Using the decomposition of pii we rewrite pit as
pit = (1− αi)(1− γ + γ)pMt + αi(1− γ)P + αiγpij
= (1− γ)p¯t + γ
(
(1− αi)pMt + αipij
)
= (1− γ)p¯t + γ
(
(1− λ)pMt + λpjt
)
; with λ =
αi
αj
∈ (0, 1).
By construction, ∀(t, σ), pit 6= p¯t, thus, strict convexity of the K-L divergence ensures
that ∃ > 0 : for all (t, σ),
d(P ||pit) < (1− γ)d(P ||p¯) + γ(1− λ)d(P ||pMt ) + γλd(P ||pjt )− .
Summing over t and averaging leads to
d¯(P ||pi)− d¯(P ||pj) < (1− γ)d¯(P ||p¯) + γ(1− λ)d¯(P ||pM ) + (γλ− 1 + γ − γ)d¯(P ||pj).
which rearranging gives
d¯(P ||pi)− d¯(P ||pj) < (1− γ) [d¯(P ||p¯)− d¯(P ||pj)]+ γ(1− λ)[d¯(P ||pM )− d¯(P ||pj)]
<a (1− γ) [d¯(P ||p¯)− d¯(P ||pj)]+ 0
<b (1− γ) [d¯(P ||pM )− d¯(P ||pj)]
<a 0 P -a.s.
(a) : Because d¯(P ||pM )− d¯(P ||pj) ≤ 0 P -a.s., by Prop 3.2
(b) : By definition of p¯ and convexity of the K-L, d¯(P ||p¯) ≤ (1−α)d¯(P ||pM ) ≤ d¯(P ||pM )
Because d¯(P ||pi)− d¯(P ||pj) < 0 P -a.s., agent j vanishes by Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof.
(a) all agents survive in every sequence.
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Definition 5.1 implies ∀(σ, t) :
∀i ∈ I, pi(σt) :=
t∏
τ=1
pi(στ |στ−1) =
(
1− αi0
)
pM (σt) + αi0pi
i(σt).
Note that ∀(t, σ),∀i ∈ I, lim
t→∞
βtpi(σt)
q(σt) = limt→∞
βt((1−αi0)pM (σt)+αi0pii(σt))
βtpM (σt)
> 0. Thus,
all agents survive in all sequences because no trader satisfies Massari (2017) nec-
essary and sufficient condition for a trader to vanish.
(b) no WOC occur and lim
t→∞ p
M (·|σt−1) = piBIP (·), P -a.s..
Equation (2.1) implies ∀(σ, t) :
pM (σt) =
∑
i∈I
ci0p
i(σt) =
∑
i∈I
ci0α
i
0∑
i∈I c
i
0α
i
0
pii(σt)
Thus, pM (σt) is formally equivalent to the probability obtained by Bayes’ rule with
prior weights
[
c10α
1
0∑
i∈I c
i
0α
i
0
, ...,
cI0α
I
0∑
i∈I c
i
0α
i
0
]
on models
[
pi1, ..., piI
]
. The result follows
from Berk (1966) which shows that the bayesian posterior converges a.s. to the
model in the support with the lowest K-L divergence, piBIP .
B Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let start by quoting Theorem 3.1 of Hajek (1982) and an immediate Corollary (B.1).
We are going to use Corollary B.1 to show that α can be chosen small enough to put a
tight probabilistic bound on the fraction of periods market probabilities are outside of
an arbitrarily small neighborhood of P when P = piBCP .
Let (Yt)
∞
t=0 be a sequence of real valued adopted random variables, with drift E[Yt+1−
Yt|Ft] such that for some a ∈ (−∞,+∞) and ρ ∈ (0, 1), η ∈ (0,∞), D <∞:
D0 : E[eη(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft] ≤ D for t ≥ 0 ,
D1 : E[eη(Yt+1−Yt); Yt > a|Ft] ≤ ρ for t ≥ 0 ,
D2 : E[eη(Yt+1−a); Yt ≤ a|Ft] ≤ D for t ≥ 0.
Theorem B.1. (Hajek, 1982). Assume conditions D0, D1, and D2. For any  > 0 and
b > a, there exist constants K and δ < 1 such that
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{Yt<b} ≤ ρ0(1− )
}
≤ KδT , (B.1)
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where ρ0 = 1− 11−ρDeη(a−b).
Corollary B.1. Assume conditions D0, D1, and D2. For any  > 0 and b > a, there
exist constants K and δ < 1 such that
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{Yt<b} ≥ ρ0(1− )
}
≥ 1−KδT .
Proof. P
{
1
T
∑T
t=1 I{Yt<b} ≥ ρ0(1− )
}
= 1−P
{
1
T
∑T
t=1 I{Yt<b} ≤ ρ0(1− )
}
≥by B.1 1−KδT .
Reminder of our notation
S = {u, d} The state space only has two states
P True probability
I Set of I agents
pii Dogmatic probabilities of agent i ∈ I
pM (σt|σt−1) Market probability of state σt in σt−1
pi(σt|σt−1) Agent i’s belief of state σt in σt−1
cit(σ) Agent i’s consumption in (t, σ)
αi = α ∈ (0, 1] Agent i’s mixing coefficient
pM (σt|σt−1) =
∑
i∈I c
i
t−1(σ)pi(σt|σt−1)
cit(σ) = c
i
t−1(σ)
pi(σt|σt−1)
pM (σt|σt−1)
pi(σt|σt−1) = (1− α)pM (σt|σt−1) + αpii(σt)
Consumption-share and beliefs dynamics
By Equation (A.1), if agents use identical weights α, then market probabilities are
pM (σt+1|σt) =
∑
i∈I
cit(σ)pi
i(σt+1). (B.2)
To ease notation we focus on state u and define P := P{σt+1 = u}, piBCP := piBCP {σt+1 =
u}, pii := pii(σt+1 = u|σt), pMt+1 := pM (σt+1 = u|σt) and cit := cit(σ).
Because the economy only has two states, Corollary 5.1 implies that at most two agents
survive and we can focus WLOG on the case in which there are only two agents: l = i
and r = i¯ with pil < P = PBCP < pir.9 Our result depends on the evolution of the
log-ratio of the consumption-shares between these two agents, that is, the real adapted
process Yt = log
(
crt
clt
)
.
9The current proof can be modified to directly cover the case of more than two agents by
replacing pir and pil by piRt :=
∑
pit>P
piicit−1(σ) and pi
L
t :=
∑
pit<P
piicit−1(σ); c
r
t (σ) and c
l
t(σ) with
cRt (σ) :=
∑
pit>P
cit−1(σ) and c
L
t (σ) :=
∑
pit<P
cit−1(σ) and providing a bound on the difference pi
R
t −piLt
that holds uniformly for every consumption-share distribution within agents in L and R.
29
We introduce a number of Lemmas to show that, as α → 0, (Yt)∞t=0 satisfies conditions
D0, D1, and D2 in such a way to ensure that pMt+1 stays most of the time arbitrarily
close to P .
Lemma B.1. Under A1-A3, for all t ≥ 0, for all η > 0,
E[eη(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft] =P
(
1 + α
pir − pil
αpil + (1− α)pMt+1
)η
+ (1− P )
(
1− α pi
r − pil
α(1− pil) + (1− α)(1− pMt+1)
)η
.
Proof. By definition of (Yt)
∞
t=0,
Yt+1 − Yt = log
crt+1
clt+1
− log c
r
t
clt
= log
pr(σt+1|σt)
pl(σt+1|σt) .
Thus,
Yt+1|σt+1=u − Yt = log
(
αpir + (1− α)pMt+1
αpil + (1− α)pMt+1
)
;
Yt+1|σt+1=d − Yt = log
(
α(1− pir) + (1− α)(1− pMt+1)
α(1− pil) + (1− α)(1− pMt+1)
)
.
Computing the expected value
E[eη(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft] = P
(
αpir + (1− α)pMt+1
αpil + (1− α)pMt+1
)η
+ (1− P )
(
α(1− pir) + (1− α)(1− pMt+1)
α(1− pil) + (1− α)(1− pMt+1)
)η
=P
(
1 + α
pir − pil
αpil + (1− α)pMt+1
)η
+ (1− P )
(
1− α pi
r − pil
α(1− pil) + (1− α)(1− pMt+1)
)η
.
Lemma B.2. Under A1-A3, for all t ≥ 0, let η = xα , with x ∈ [α, 1], then there exists
a B <∞, independent of η and α, such that:
E[eη(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft] ≤ 1− x(pMt+1 − P )
pir − pil
pMt+1(1− pMt+1)
+ x2
B
2
.
Proof. For α = xη , we can express E[e
η(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft] as a function of x, η and pM :
f(x, η, pMt+1) := E[e
η(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft]
=By Lem.B.1 P
(
1 +
x
η
pir − pil
x
η (pi
l − pMt+1) + pMt+1
)η
+ (1− P )
(
1− x
η
pir − pil
x
η (p
M
t+1 − pil) + 1− pMt+1
)η
.
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Taylor expanding f in x around 0, ∀pM ∈ [pil, pir]
f(x, η, pM ) = 1− x(pM − P ) pi
r − pil
pM (1− pM ) + x
2B(ξ, η, p
M )
2
for a ξ ∈ (0, x) and
B(ξ, η, pM ) =
∂2f(x, η, pM )
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
x=ξ
= PBup(ξ, η, p
M , pil, pir)+(1−P )Bdown(ξ, η, pM , pil, pir);
with

Bup(ξ, η, p
M , pil, pir) = η(η − 1)
(
1 + ξ
η
pir−pil
(pil−pM ) x
η
+pM
)η−2 pir−pilη
(pil−pM ) x
η
+pM
−
ξ
η2
(pir−pil)(pil−pM )
((pil−pM ) x
η
+pM )2

2
+
+η
(
1 + ξ
η
pir−pil
(pil−pM ) x
η
+pM
)η−1− 2η2 (pir−pil)(pil−pM )
((pil−pM ) x
η
+pM )2
+
2
ξ
η3
(pir−pil)(pil−pM )2
((pil−pM ) x
η
+pM )3
2
Bdown(ξ, η, p
M , pil, pir) = Bup(ξ, η, 1− pM , 1− pil, 1− pir)
.
The proof proceeds by finding a finite upper bound for Bup(ξ, η, p
M , pil, pir) and
Bdown(ξ, η, p
M , pil, pir) that holds for all ξ ∈ [0, 1], η ∈ [1,+∞), and pM ∈ [pil, pir]. For
this purpose note that the limit for η →∞ is well defined,
lim
η→∞Bup(ξ, η, p
M , pil, pir) =
(pir − pil)2
(pM )2
e
ξ
(pir−pil)
pM .
Naming y = 1/η the function Bup(ξ, y =
1
η , p
M , pil, pir) is continuous on the compact
[0, 1] × [0, 1] × [pil, pir]. By the Weierstrass Theorem such a function has a maximum
B¯up <∞. In the same way Bdown has a maximum B¯down. Defining
B(pil, pir) =
∣∣PB¯up + (1− P )B¯down∣∣ <∞
we have proved that for all t and for all α and η such that αη = x ∈ [0, 1]
f(x, η, pMt+1) ≤ 1− x(pMt+1 − P )
pir − pil
pMt+1(1− pMt+1)
+ x2
B
2
.
Next we present a series of lemmas showing that conditions D0, D1, D2, holds
uniformly for arbitrarily large η, as long as ηα = x is kept small enough. Importantly
for the proof of Theorem B.2, these lemmas requires ηα to be small but allow to send
α→ 0 and thus to make η arbitrarily large.
Lemma B.3. D0: Under A1-A3, there exists a D <∞ such that if η = xα , then
∀x ∈ [α, 1], ∀t ≥ 0 E[eη(Yt+1−Yt)|Ft] < D.
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Proof. The proof follows easily by Lemma B.2 upon choosing
D = max
x∈[α,1],pM∈[pil,pir]
{
1− x(pM − P ) pi
r − pil
pM (1− pM ) + x
2B
2
}
.
Lemma B.4. D1: Under A1-A3, ∀a > 0, let a = log
(
P+a−pil
pir−P−a
)
, x¯a =
4a(pir−pil)
B and
η = x¯aα . Then, ∃ρ(x¯a) < 1 :
∀α ∈ (0, x¯a], ∀t ≥ 0, E
[
eη(Yt+1−Yt); Yt > a |Ft
]
≤ ρ(x¯a) < 1.
Proof. By Equation (B.2), pMt+1 = pi
lclt + pi
rcrt , so that Yt := log
(
crt
clt
)
= log
(
pMt+1−pil
pir−pMt+1
)
.
Therefore, for any a and a, on the event {Yt > a} the price satisfies pMt+1 > P + a.
Together with Lemma B.2 this implies that for all t
E[eη(Yt+1−Yt);Yt > a|Ft] ≤ 1− xa pi
r − pil
pMt+1(1− pMt+1)
+ x2
B
2
≤ 1− 4xa(pir − pil) + x2B
2
≤ 1− 4
22a(pi
r − pil)2
2B
; for x = x¯a =
4a(pi
r − pil)
B
= ρ(x¯a) < 1.
Lemma B.5. D2: Under A1-A3, ∀a > 0, let a = log
(
P+a−pil
pir−P−a
)
and η = xα . Then,
there exists a D <∞ such that
∀x ∈ [α, 1], ∀t ≥ 0 E[eη(Yt+1−a); Yt ≤ a|Ft] < D.
Proof. Note that g < a⇒ E[eη(Yt+1−a); Yt = g|Ft] ≤ E[eη(Yt+1−Yt);Yt = g|Ft].
The latter is bounded by a D for all g by Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.6. In an economy with 2 states and 2 agents with diverse beliefs, for any
b > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1) there exists α¯r, K <∞ and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α ∈ (0, α¯r)
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pMt <piBCP+b} ≥ 1− q
}
≥ 1−KδT
Proof. By Corollary B.1, under D0, D1, D2, for any  ∈ (0, 1) and b > a there exists a
constant K < +∞ and δ < 1 such that,
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P{
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
I{Yt<b} ≥
(
1− 1
1− ρDe
η(a−b)
)
(1− )
}
≥ 1−KδT . (B.3)
Let b = log
(
piBCP+b−pil
pir−piBCP−b
)
, so that {Yt < b} if and only if pMt+1 < piBCP + b. Setting
a = b2 , Equation (B.3) becomes
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pMt <piBCP+b} ≥
(
1− 1
1− ρDe
−η b
2
)
(1− )
}
≥ 1−KδT . (B.4)
By Lemma B.4, taking α ∈ (0, x¯a] and η = x¯aα implies
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pMt <piBCP+b} ≥
(
1− De
− bx¯a
2α
1− ρ(x¯a)
)
(1− )
}
≥ 1−KδT ,
where the denominator is independent on α. Thus, for every q ∈ (0, 1), there exists an
α¯r and an  such that for every α ∈ (0, α¯r)(
1− De
− bx¯a
2α
1− ρ(x¯a)
)
(1− ) ≥ (1− q).
Lemma B.7. In an economy with 2 states and 2 agents with diverse beliefs, for any
b > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1) there exists α¯l, K <∞ and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α ∈ (0, α¯l)
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pMt >piBCP−b} ≥ 1− q
}
≥ 1−KδT
Proof. Define Zt = −Yt and repeat the steps of the previous lemma.
Theorem B.2. In an economy with 2 agents, for any  > 0 there exists α¯ such that for
all α ∈ (0, α¯)
d¯(P ||pMα ) < d(P ||piBCP ) + , P -a.s..
Proof. We consider two cases. First: piBCP = piBIP , and second, piBCP 6= piBIP .
• First:cpiBCP = piBIP ⇒by Prop.3.3 d¯(P ||piBCP ) = d¯(P ||pMα ) = d¯(P ||piBIP ), ∀α P -
a.s..
• Second: piBCP 6= piBIP .
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By Lemma B.6 and Lemma B.7, given an b > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1) there exists an
α¯ = min{α¯l, α¯r} such that for all α ∈ (0, α¯)
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{|pMt −piBCP |<b} ≥ 1− q
}
≥ 1−KδT .
By continuity of the K-L divergence, for all d > 0 there exists an b such that |pMt −
piBCP | < b implies |d(P ||pMt )− d(P ||piBCP )| < d. Thus
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|<d} ≥ 1− q
}
≥ 1−KδT ; (B.5)
and, equivalently,
P
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|≥d} ≤ q
}
≥ 1−KδT . (B.6)
Equations (B.5) and (B.6) imply that, ∀T ,
P
{∑T
t=1 d(P ||pMt )− d(P ||piBCP )
T
< 
}
=P

∑T
t=1 d(P ||pMt )− d(P ||piBCP )I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|<d}
T
+
∑T
t=1 d(P ||pMt )− d(P ||piBCP )I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|≥d}
T
< 

≥P
d
∑T
t=1 I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|<d}
T
+ max
pM∈[pil,pir ]
{d(P ||pM )− d(P ||piBCP )}
∑T
t=1 I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|≥d}
T
< 

≥aP
 maxpM∈[pil,pir ]{d(P ||pM )− d(P ||piBCP )}
∑T
t=1 I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|≥d}
T
< − d

=
b
P

∑T
t=1 I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|≥d}
T
<
− d
max
pM∈[pil,pir ]{d(P ||pM )− d(P ||piBCP )}

≥1−KδT .
(a): Because
∑T
t=1 I{|d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )|<d}
T ≤ 1 ;
(b): by Equation (B.6), with q <
−d
max
pM∈[pil,pir ]{d(P ||pM )−d(P ||piBCP )}
.
Where d, q depends on α but are independent of T .
Let FT :=
{∑T
t=1 d(P ||pMt )−d(P ||piBCP )
T < 
}
.
The only thing left to show is that P
{
lim
T→∞
FT
}
= 1:
P
{
lim
T→∞
FT
}
≥ P
{
lim inf
T→∞
FT
}
= 1− P
{
(lim inf
T→∞
FT )
C
}
= 1− P
{
lim sup
T→∞
FCT
}
=a 1
34
(a): by Borel-Cantelli lemma: lim
T→∞
∑T
t=1 P
{
FCt
}
<∞⇒ P
{
lim sup
T→∞
FCT
}
= 0;
which, in our context holds because lim
T→∞
∑T
t=1 P
{
FCt
} ≤ lim∑Tt=1Kδt <∞.
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